Some types of foreclosure in English, Australian and American law are as follows: Australian law has now gone beyond the position taken in the High Trees case, in cases where there is no pre-existing legal relationship between the two parties and where the confiscation of promissory notes can be used as a ”sword” and not just as a ”shield”. Mason CJ and Wilson J in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher concluded that if forfeiture is demonstrated, it will result in justice in favor of the plaintiff and the court will make the minimum of fairness that is fair in the circumstances. From this case, it is also possible that the promise comes from silence or inaction. There are many types of confiscation that can occur, but the common denominator between them is that a person is prevented from asserting a certain position in the law where it would be unfair to do so. For example, if a court finds that a party has done something that justifies some form of estoppel, that party is said to be prevented from making certain related arguments or asserting certain related rights. The defendant is prevented from presenting the relevant defence or the plaintiff is prevented from presenting the relevant argument against the defendant. Lord Coke explained: ”This is called confiscation or conclusion because a person`s action or acceptance stops or closes his mouth to affirm or honor the truth.”  n. an obstacle or obstacle (disability) that prevents a person from asserting a fact or right, or that prevents an act from being denied. Such an obstacle is due to the actions, behaviors, statements, admission, inaction or judgment of a person against the person in an identical legal case. Forfeiture includes blocking by misrepresentation or obfuscation (fair estoppel), failure to take legal action until the other party is affected by the delay (estoppel par laches) and a court decision against the party in the same case in another case (collateral estoppel).
(See: Collateral estoppel, fair trade estoppel, estop, laches) In English law, Estoppel by representation of fact is a term coined by Spencer Bower. This type of estoppel is also referred to as ”common law estoppel by representation” in Halsbury`s Laws of England, Volume 16(2), reissued in 2003. A representation can be made by words or behavior. Although the presentation must be clear and unambiguous, a representation may be derived from silence if there is a duty to speak, or from negligence if a duty of care has arisen. Under English law, forfeiture by presentation of facts generally serves as a defence, although it may act in support of a plea or counterclaim. It is questionable whether forfeiture by convention is a separate doctrine from forfeiture or simply a case of forfeiture based on trust (forfeiture by representation would be its most common form) or whether the rule of interpretation is that when the words of a contract are ambiguous, those words are always interpreted in such a way that the actual intentions of the parties are put into practice, although this is not the usual legal outcome (see Amalgamated Investment and Property Co. Ltd.c. Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd  QB 84).
”Any person who, by his speech or conduct, has caused another person to act in a certain way should not be allowed to adopt a contradictory position, attitude or conduct, is not presumed to be the loss or harm of others.”  For example, a party with multiple and contradictory legal positions is prevented between two or more claimants from expressing its views against another coherent and specific claim, i.e., preferential treatment for certain claims over uncertain claims. In general, confiscation is ”a shield, not a sword” – it cannot be used alone as the basis for an act.  It does not remove any rights either. In High Trees, the plaintiff company was able to restore payment of the full rent from early 1945 and could have reinstated the entire rent at any time in accordance with the original promise, provided that reasonable notice had been given. In this case, confiscation has been applied to a ”negative promise”, i.e. a promise in which a party promises not to enforce all rights. The Contract Forfeiture Act was summarised in Peekay Intermark Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd  EWCA Civ 386: there seems to be no reason why the principles of forfeiture by deed should not apply to the assignment of a patent right. The grantor purports to transfer the right to exclude other persons, in one case from a defined parcel of land and in the other from a described and limited area of useful arts. The difference between the two cases is only to determine exactly which subject is transmitted.  The equitable estoppel is the American counterpart of the estoppel per representation. Its elements are summarized as follows: The doctrine of estoppel (which may prevent a party from asserting a right) is often confused with the doctrine of renunciation (which refers to the waiver of a right once it has arisen).
It also essentially overlaps with the just doctrine of the Laches, but differs from it. It seems well regulated that the assignee of a patent is prevented from saying that his patent is void because of lack of novelty or usefulness or because previous inventions have provided for it. But this confiscation does not prevent him from denying an offence for obvious reasons. In order to decide such a question, it is permissible to demonstrate the prior art that the court can see what the case has been assigned and thus determine the primary or secondary nature of the transferred patent and the extent to which the doctrine of equivalence can be invoked against an infringer. The court shall not assume against an assignor and in favour of its assignee anything other than that the invention has a sufficient degree of usefulness and novelty to justify the grant of the granted patent.  Present-based confiscation and orderly forfeiture are mutually exclusive: the former is based on a presentation of existing facts (or mixed facts and laws), while the latter is based on the promise not to assert an already existing right (i.e., it expresses an intention with respect to the future). A process for preventing promissory notes exists only between parties who were in an existing relationship at the time of representation, although this is not a prerequisite for falsification by the presentation of facts. In English law, the owner estoppel differs from the promissory estoppel. Property forfeiture is not a concept in U.S.
law, but a similar result is often achieved under the general doctrine of promissory estoppel. The doctrine of forfeiture of promissory notes prevents a party from withdrawing a promise from a second party if the latter has reasonably relied on that commitment. Fair trade estoppel is different from order estoppel. The promissory note prevention process contains a clear and unambiguous promise, while the cheap legal prevention process contains only representations and incentives. The statements involved in the confiscation of promissory notes are based on future intent, while the fair confiscation of rights involves the determination of past or present facts. It is also said that fair confiscation is a misdemeanour, whereas the charge is in the contract. The main difference between equitable estoppel and order estoppel is that the former is only available as a defense, while the prevention process of the Promissory Act can be used as the basis for a claim for damages. .